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COMMENTARY

C O M M E N T A R Y
recent proposal to hike the salary
Gubernatorial Theof Maine’s
governor above its present
$70,000 level met a legislative road block
Power and the recently in Augusta. Even though this was
first proposal to increase the salary
Struggle for theof Maine’s
chief executive officer in more
than fourteen years and even though
Executive only two other states—Nebraska and
below us on the totem
Efficiency Arkansas—are
pole of gubernatorial salaries, the
increase was quickly scuttled
in Twentieth proposed
by legislative leaders.
This recent episode is but one other
Century Maine illustration
of the diminished regard that
By Paul H. Mills
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Maine appears to have for affording its
governor the prestige and authority that
is given in so many other states. It is also
but one of several symbolic expressions
of how Maine regards its governor and
the frustrations that executive authority
often has encountered in recent decades.
Limits to executive power are inherent
in a system of checks and balances. While
they serve to prevent abuses in power,
they also have the unintended consequence of thwarting our elected executives from implementing a coherent set
of policies for the state in an efficient and
business-like manner. Beginning with the
1931 Gardiner Adminstrative Code, this
commentary looks at several significant
attempts to improve executive efficiency,
including actions of the legislature and
the voters themselves.
Like many Maine governors, Tudor
Gardiner is better known for what he did
after leaving the Blaine House than for
what he accomplished during his tenure
in Augusta. His daring mission behind
enemy lines in Italy just before the allied
invasion there in 1943 was one of the
most heroic episodes of World War II.
However, fifteen years earlier Gardiner
had become the twentieth century’s
second youngest governor (Ken Curtis

was the youngest) when, at age thirty-six,
he was elected in 1928 to the first of two
terms that ended in 1933.
Upon assuming office, Gardiner
found a proliferation of independent
boards, commissions and committees
whose authorities frequently duplicated
one another. Moreover, at that time, a
governor often had to wait long into his
administration for the expiration of the
terms of these officials before putting his
own people in power. In short, Gardiner
found that Maine governors were not able
to govern. Though what Gardiner found
is a condition which, to some extent, still
exists and though there has hardly been
a Blaine House occupant who did not
complain about it, Gardiner is among
the few who was able to do something
about it.
Gardiner realized that to bring about
a dramatic change in government organization required either a crisis or an indepth non-partisan independent survey.
Realizing that the legislature itself might
not approve the $20,000 required to
finance such a survey, Gardiner obtained
a grant from the Spelman Fund to hire the
National Institute of Public Administration
to conduct a study on the many technical
aspects of Maine government. The result
was a 1930 survey that recommended
a consolidation of many separate functioning agencies and a strengthened
gubernatorial role in appointing powers.
Recognizing that the legislature might
not be enthusiastic about building up a
branch of government that could more
effectively compete with its own authority,
Gardiner appealed to a conservative sense
of government economy, emphasizing that
by creating a more coherent system and
tightening up the previously loose aggregation of agencies, extensive cost savings
to government would result.
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The 1931 Gardiner Administrative
Code that resulted from these efforts
abolished twenty-eight of the state’s
bureaus and agencies and put four departments with centralized decisionmaking
responsibilities in their place. Over a
dozen separate fiefdoms that ran the
gamut from the Tuberculosis Board to
the Crop Pest Commission were put
under the single umbrella of a newly
created Health and Welfare Department.
Decisionmaking efficiency and streamlined control over state affairs were the
hallmarks of the new code.
While the Gardiner Administrative
Code moved the state in the direction
of establishing some department heads
whose tenure was coterminous with the
governor, there remained in 1940—and
for many years afterward—a number of
positions over which the governor had
little or no authority, and a number of
boards and agencies with terms that
expired long after the governor’s. For
example, Public Utilities Commissioners
and University of Maine Trustees had
seven-year terms, a tenure that also was
afforded the chairman of the State
Highway Commission when that term
was extended from three to seven years in
1953. (In contrast, until 1958, governors
were elected for two-year terms. Clinton
Clauson, a Waterville chiropractor and
also long-time director of the federal
Internal Revenue Service for Maine, was
the first to be so elected to a four-year
term, but, because he died in office, it
would not be until the completion
of John Reed’s full term in 1967 that
Maine would have a governor who had
completed a four-year term.)
Moreover, by 1966, once again a
proliferation of state agencies created to
meet the challenges of a changing world
but not always with an eye toward

preserving a scheme of efficient government, left a number of stumbling blocks
in the path of a governor attempting to
implement his vision for the state. The
similarities between the Curtis reforms
and the Gardiner reforms are significant,
beginning, ironically, with the fact that
Kenneth M. Curtis and William Tudor
Gardiner were the two youngest governors
to hold office in the twentieth century.
Faced with a proliferation of agencies
and departments, each commissioned a
study to analyze the efficiency of state
government and, based upon the results
of that study, proceeded to forward a plan
to sharply revise matters. In 1972-73,
Governor Curtis reorganized 85% of all
executive departments into a modified
cabinet system. With the heads of the
executive department now serving coterminously, governors have since been able
to choose department heads who suited
their own plans for the future and who
would work toward implementing their
own short- and long-range goals, rather
than being handcuffed by the executive
appointments of a previous administration, which might well be of a different
political party.
Still, throughout the Democratic
Muskie-Clauson era, governors had to
have appointments confirmed by the
GOP legislatively elected governor’s
council. Under these circumstances,
the governor, in effect, was required
to abdicate much of his already weak
appointive responsibility to allow for the
fact that confirmation had to occur by
a seven-member body of the opposite
political party that wielded considerable
veto power and was expected to be
consulted in advance before the posting
of the most prominent gubernatorial
nominees. An arrangement Muskie
reached to avert impasse was an acknowl-
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The inauguration
of term limits in
1996 also may
serve to amplify
the powers
of the executive.
edgment that some two-thirds of his
appointees would be drawn from the
Republican party.
Finally, in 1977, the executive council
was abolished; the legislative committees
and Senate took over the council’s
confirmatory powers. The resulting structural change has afforded the governor
more flexibility, in large part, because the
confirming bodies are larger, more
cumbersome, and more remote from the
governor, making it more difficult for
the legislature to have coherent, on-going
input into the initial selection process.
Thus, since 1940, the powers of the
executive have been amplified most notably
by the 1957 constitutional amendment
that extended the governor’s term to four
years, the introduction of the modified
cabinet system in 1972, and abolition
of the executive council in 1977.
The inauguration of term limits in
1996 also may serve to amplify the
powers of the executive. However, even
with term limits, Maine legislators today
are more experienced than their 1940
counterparts. For example, only sixty-nine
of the 151 house members elected for the
term that served in 1940 had previous
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legislative experience, a ratio typical of
the era. It was not until the 1960s that
the twentieth century consistently saw a
majority of both branches of the legislature elected from the ranks of those who
had served at least one prior term. This
is now the norm despite the advent of
term limits. Indeed, thirty-one of the
thirty-five state senators elected in 1998
were incumbents.

party in only eleven of the last forty-seven
years, and at no time has this occurred in
the last fifteen years. All governors elected
from 1986 through the present have had
a different political affiliation than the
legislative majority elected to serve with
them. It seems that our government has
a popularly instituted regime of almost
permanent bipartite and often—as in the
instances when an Independent governor

All governors elected from 1986 through the
present have had a different political affiliation than
the legislative majority elected to serve with them.
Despite the significance of reform
efforts since the Gardiner Administrative
Code, responsibility for one of the more
significant checks on executive authority
lies not with the head of any legislative,
executive or judicial department, but
instead rests with the people themselves.
In the first fifty-four years of the twentieth
century, with the exception of the four
years of the two Brann administrations
(1933-1937), those that the voters elected
to be governor and to serve in the legislature were always of the same political
party. Thus, when the voters elected a
Democratic governor in 1910 and again
in 1914, they also elected a Democratic
legislature to go with him. At all other
times (but for the brief Brann interval),
the voters also selected members of the
same political party for each elected
branch of government.
However, since the election of
Edmund Muskie in 1954, this has not
been the norm. The governor and the
legislature have been of the same political
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has faced a Democratic House and GOP
Senate—tripartite government. In the case
of Independent James Longley, the executive and legislative relationship remained
adversarial, with the legislature often
gaining the upper hand by virtue of
Longley’s somewhat uncompromising
posture, and on account of the ability
of both Republicans and Democrats to
unite in overriding the veto authority he
frequently exercised (some sixty-seven
or over half of Governor Longley’s
vetoes were overridden by the two-thirds
legislative vote).
Thus, even as the mechanics of
government have become more efficient
through reforms, the people of Maine
themselves have created and enforced a
system in which governor and legislature
are set at odds and hampered in their
ability to move forward with their respective goals. It is doubtful whether any
amount of legal change can effect a
modification in a system the people
themselves have chosen to institute and

sustain. Thus, even as the twentieth
century’s most enthusiastic and active
governors were attempting to implement
their policies for the state of Maine, they
have been met with a number of barriers
to exercise the authority needed to put
those policies into effect. Even as government in the state of Maine has steadily
progressed to a more business-like and
efficient model by learning the lessons
of corporate structure and applying them
to the structure of government, conflicts
over more fundamental theories of political outlook—as backed by the choices
of the people of the state of Maine—
have contained gubernatorial power.
It is perhaps that the people of Maine
have recognized one of the fundamental
truths of democracy likewise realized
by our nation’s founders: the effective
concentration of power in any one
individual leads to the opportunity for
excessive control and corruption. The
dispersal of power among the various
branches of Maine’s government, while
recurringly frustrating to those who
inhabit the Blaine House, also prevents
the overly rapid implementation of policies—which may initially seem attractive
but eventually prove detrimental to the
welfare of the state. 
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